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NoTEs Am) CoxnmNTS
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS-USE, MAINTENANCE OR GRANT
OF RIGHT OF WAY ACROSS RESTRICTED PROPERTY
It is believed that the legal problems to be discussed in this note
may best be introduced by assuming a hypothetical fact situation
which will present the question involved. The problem will be dis-
cussed then in the light of the hypothetical situation set up.
With this view in mind, assume the following: Subdivision I and
Subdivision II are adjacently located in X County, Kentucky. Each of
these subdivisions contains a street named South Ridge Drive. Be-
tween these streets, and in Subdivision I, lies a lot designated as Lot
No. 3, Block B. Plaintiff owns Subdivision I and is a lot holder
therein. Defendant is the owner of Subdivision II. When the owner
of Subdivision I subdivided his land and recorded a plat thereof, he
formulated a set of uniform restrictions and covenants as a common
scheme- for the benefit of all future owners of lots in that subdivision.
Among these restrictions was the covenant that "no lot in Subdivision
I shall be used for other than residential purposes," and he represented
to prospective purchasers that one of the attractive features of Sub-
division I would be the lack of through traffic. Plaintiff inserted these
restrictions and covenants in most of the deeds by which he conveyed
the respective lots in his subdivision and most of the deeds referred
to the recorded plat. Lot No. 3, Block B (mentioned above) was con-
veyed to "A" and the deed by which this conveyance was made con-
tained the above restrictions and was duly recorded. "A" subsequently
conveyed this lot to the defendant who owned the lots in Subdivision
II. This deed to defendant did not contain the above restrictions, but
there is substantial evidence that defendant had actual notice of the
restrictions when he purchased the lot, although neither actual notice
nor the presence of the restrictions in his chain of title is necessary in
order for the restrictions to bind his lot.1 Defendant claims the right
to construct a street across Lot No. 8, Block B of Subdivision I, making
the street known as South Ridge Drive a through street, thus connect-
ing Subdivisions I and II. The owners of the other lots in Subdivision
I, are contesting this right.
This fact situation immediately raises the following question: Is the
grant, use, or maintenance of a right of way over property restricted
to residential purposes a violation of a valid restrictive covenant such
as will give adjacent land owners a right of action in equity?
It is the purpose of this note to stress that portion of the question
'Harp v. Parker, 278 Ky. 78, 128 S.W. 2d 211 (1939).
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concerning the specific type of violation evidenced in the assumed
fact situation, but it is believed that for the purposes of clarity a pre-
liminary general discussion concerning the nature and validity of
restrictive covenants is necessary.
General Rules Concerning Restrictive Covenants on Land. Al-
though covenants restricting the free use of land are looked upon
with some disfavor in the courts of this country, they are generally
sustained2 when reasonable 3 and not contrary to public policy.4 The
Kentucky court in Highland Realty Co. v. Graves expressed the gen-
eral rule as follows:
While such conditions as impose a restraint upon the free use or
alienation of real estate are looked upon with disfavor by the courts,
and are rather strictly construed, inasmuch as they detract from the
freest use of the fee simple, and are annoying to owners and intended
purchasers, being somewhat at variance, too, with the system in vogue
in this country which regards real estate as an article of commerce,
still they are upheld when not repugnant to some plain provision of
the law, and are not unreasonable in themselves.5
Since, even while sustaining reasonable restrictive covenants, the
courts do look upon them with disfavor, it would obviously follow
that such covenants restricting the free use of land should be strictly
construed.6 This rule should not, however, be applied in such a way
as to defeat the plain and obvious purposes of the contractual instru-
ment or restriction-primarily the question is one of intention.
7
In the case of subdivisions where a common grantor conveys to
different parties a number of lots burdened by a restrictive covenant
the problem arises as to whether or not one purchaser may enforce
the restrictive covenant against his neighbor, another purchaser.
Obviously in the absence of some special mutuality of covenant, one
who receives a deed from a grantor who imposes restrictions on the
land conveyed to him cannot enforce corresponding restrictions
against his grantor as to the latter's remaining land, and consequently
'Christie v. Lyons, 173 Okla. 158, 47 P. 2d 128 (1935); Bauby v. Krasow,
107 Conn. 109, 139 A. 508, 57 A.L.R. 331 (1927); Stahl v. Dyer, 235 Mich. 355,
209 N.W. 107 (1926); Starck v. Foley, 209 Ky. 332, 272 S.W. 890 (1925).
'Stevenson v. Spivey, 132 Va. 115, 110 S.E. 367 (1922).
'Moore v. Stevens, 90 Fla. 879, 106 So. 901 (1925); Fusha v. Dacono Town-
site Co., 60 Colo. 315, 153 P. 226 (1915); Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55
(1879).
'Highland Realty Co. v. Groves, 130 Ky. 374, 377-8, 113 S.W. 420, 421
(1908).
'Fischer v. Reissig, 143 S.W. 2d 130 (Tex. 1940); Wing v. Forrest Lawn
Cemetery, 15 Cal. 2d 472, 101 P. 2d 1099 (1940). Christie v. Lyons, 173 Oka.
158, 47 P. 2d 128 (1935).
" Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, Inc., 34 Cal. 2d 442, 211 P. 2d 302, 19
A.L.R. 2d 1268 (1949); Brown v. Hofnacki, 270 Mich. 557, 259 N.W. 152 (1935);
see also Dorsey v. Fisherman's Wharf Realty Co., 306 Ky. 445, 207 S.W. 2d 565
(1948).
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-.annot enforce such restrictions against subsequent grantees of that
land or part of it. . . . But in the case of platted subdivisions, where
the lots are sold under similar restrictions, each deed referring to the
plat, and are sold under a general plan of development for restricted
purposes, there is a mutuality of quasi covenant which enables each
lot owner to enforce the restrictions against each other lot owner.8
It has also been held that the fact that a common grantor fails to
include the restrictions contemplated in a portion of the conveyances
will not defeat the general plan where the transferee has notice of such
restrictions. The Michigan court in Allen v. City of Detroit stated the
rule as follows:
The law is well settled that building restrictions . . . are in the
nature of reciprocal negative easements, and may be created upon a
division, and conveyance in severalty to different grantees, of an entire
tract. That a portion of the conveyances do not contain the restric-
tions will not defeat the same. Although some of the lots may have
written restrictions imposed upon them and others not, if the general
plan has been maintained from its inception, if it has been understood,
accepted, relied on, and acted upon by all in interest, it is binding
and enforceable upon all inter se. It goes with the land, and is
equally binding on all purchasers with notice.9
The right of purchasers of lots in a subdivision subject to restric-
tions, to enforce those restrictions against adjacent lot owners seems,
by the weight of authority, to be based on the theory that such owner
has a property right which he may assert to enforce compliance with
the restriction. It should be remembered that restrictive covenants
generally give the party benefited thereby a property right enforceable
against all parties including the state and its agencies. Nevertheless
these property rights are subject to eminent domain.10
Applying these general rules to the hypothetical fact situation
posed, it would seem that here there is a restriction which is not un-
reasonable and not contrary to public policy, and one therefore that
should be enforceable by at least the original grantor. Here, also,
there is a platted subdivision, where the lots were sold under similar
restrictions in compliance with a general plan of development-this
would give the necessary quasi-mutuality to allow the adjoining lot
owners to join with the original grantor in enforcing this covenant.
True, though it is, that the restriction here was not included in the
deed by which the lot in question was conveyed to defendant, it has
already been established that since the restrictions were created by
819 A.L.R. 2d 1274, 1278 (1951).
'Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317, 319 (1911); see also Tulk
v. Moxhay,47 Eng. Rep. 1345 (1848).
"Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 143 A. 245 (1928); Flynn v.
New York W. and B. Ry. Co., 218 N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 913 (1916); Allen v.
Detroit, supra note 9.
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a previous deed from the common grantor they were binding as to the
defendant. Lastly, the right of eminent domain is not here concerned,
since no political entity or public utility is asserting the right to con-
struct this street across restricted property, but rather a private person
in his individual capacity.
Thus it would seem that the original question posed has resolved
itself into the following limited question: Does the maintenance, use
or grant of a right of way across restricted property violate a covenant
limiting the use of such property to residential purposes only? There
are comparatively few cases involving this precise question, and the
remainder of this note will be coilcerned with examining, comparing
and differentiating these pertinent cases.
Cases In Which the Use, Maintenance or Grant of Right of Way
Was Held To Violate the Restrictive Covenant. It has been held in
several cases that the maintenance, use or grant of a right of way for
public purposes across property violates a covenant restricting the use
of such property to residential purposes only. In Duggan v. Buckner"
an owner of acreage had subdivided it into blocks, lots, and driveways
and recorded a plat thereof. He conveyed these lots by deeds con-
taining stringent residential restrictions. The plat showed a small
irregular lot at the end of a dead end street. The court held that
testimony of the grantees of the two large lots between which this
small irregular lot was situated, to the effect that their purchases had
been induced by the owner's verbal representations that the dead end
street would so remain was not inconsistent with the plat but served
to clarify that which the plat might have otherwise left ambiguous.
The court then held that the evidence authorized a permanent injunc-
tion restraining the owner from using the small lot as a passageway so
as to open the dead end street and continue it across his adjoining
land. This case is analogous to the hypothetical situation posed herein,
in that both cases concern a subdivision restricted to residential pur-
poses and in both cases the original owner induced prospective pur-
chasers to purchase lots therein by verbally assuring them that there
would be no through street across the subdivision. Likewise, in Luh-
man v. New York W. and B. Ry. Co.,12 it was held that a railroad
which had constructed a line across lots subject to the restriction that
nothing other than private residences costing not less than $3000 each
' 155 S.W. 2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); see also Dewar v. Carson, 259 Pa.
599, 108 A. 848 (1918)."81 Misc. 587, 142 N.Y.S. 860 (1918), affd. without op. 168 App. Div. 964,
148 N.Y.S. 1127 (1914), affd. without op. 221 N.Y. 550, 116 N.E. 1058 (1917).
See also Flynn v. New York, W. and B. Ry. Co., 218 N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 918
(1916).
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should be erected on said lots had violated the restriction, and though
the railroad could not be enjoined due to its right of eminent domain
it must compensate the adjoining lot owners for any damages suffered
by them. It has further been held that the maintenance, use or grant
of a right of way across property, the use of which is restricted to
residential purposes, violates the restrictive covenant where the right
of way is to be used as an incident to a use other than residential.
13
This rule is based on the theory that even though such a covenant does
not prohibit any use of the property reasonably consistent with its use
for residential purposes, it clearly implies that the restricted property
is not to be put to any use incident to a forbidden business or enter-
prise even though such business or enterprise is situated on adjacent
unrestricted land.
Applying the above rules to the hypothetical situation it would
appear safe to assume that the defendant in his proposal to construct
a street through the restricted lot in question, so as to make South
Ridge Drive a through street and thus join his unrestricted land to the
restricted subdivision, was motivated by a desire to increase the value
of his land by increasing access thereto rather than by any desire
to render a public service. And since his land is unrestricted is it not
reasonable to grant the adjacent landowners in Subdivision I, the
restricted subdivision, an injunction against this proposed use of the
lot in question oh the theory that (1) as an individual having no right
of eminent domain the defendant has no standing to violate the cove-
nant restricting the property to residential uses, or (2) that to allow
this use would afford the defendant the opportunity of using this right
of way as an incident to some use other than residential?
It is acknowledged that there are numerous cases which have held
that a use, maintenance or grant of a right of way over restricted
property was not in violation of a restrictive covenant. However, it is
believed that these cases may be distinguished on their facts from the
assumed hypothetical situation. The following portion of this note
will deal with these cases and constitute an endeavor to distinguish
them.
Cases In Which the Use, Maintenance or Grant of a Right of Way
Was Held Not To Violate the Restrictive Covenant. As has been said,
since covenants restricting the free use of land are looked upon with
disfavor by the courts of this country, such covenants should be
strictly construed, and the courts in construing them should base their
' Starmount Co. v. Greensboro Memorial Park Inc., 233 N.C. 613, 65 S.E.
2d 134 (1951); Me]Iitz v. Sunfield Co., 103 Conn. 177, 129 A. 228 (1925);
Laughlin v. Wagner, 146 Tenn. 647, 244 S.W. 475 (1922).
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construction upon the intention of the parties. Therefore it would
seem obvious that if the maintenance, use or grant of a right of way
across restricted property could reasonably be held not to be a viola-
tion of the restrictive covenant within the intention of the parties,
such use, maintenance or grant should not give rise to injunctive
relief. In Bohnsack v. McDonald'4 it was held that a covenant against
conducting upon the premises any noxious, offensive, or dangerous
trade or business would not prevent the grantee from constructing
and maintaining a temporary railroad to remove materials excavated
by him in the course of construction of a public reservoir. However,
the plaintiff was awarded damages by reason of the existence of a
nuisance. The court in this case reasoned that the covenant was not
broad enough to prohibit the use of the premises as a right of way
but was merely meant to prohibit the establishment of trades or busi-
nesses of the expressed nature. In like manner it was held in Smith v.
Government Realty, Inc.15 that the owner of a lot in a subdivision
restricted to residential use and subject to building line restrictions
was not entitled to enjoin an adjacent lot owner's proposed opening of
a private alleyway. The court held that this would not be such a use
of the adjoining lot as would be prohibited by the restrictive covenant.
These cases seem to say that if the use, maintenance or grant of a right
of way is not such use of the property as is, within the contemplation
of the parties, denied by the expressed restriction, then such use or
grant of a right of way does not give an adjoining .lot owner any right
to injunctive relief. However, in the assumed fact situation the original
grantor represented to prospective purchasers that an attractive feature
of his subdivision was the lack of a through street. Is it not safe then
to assume that the intention of the parties in the fact situation here
involved was that the restriction was meant to deny the grant or use
of such a right of way as the defendant proposes? And therefore, is
not the fact situation originally assumed distinguishable from the
above cases by reason of this intention?
In Cook v. Murlin10 the court refused to enjoin the use of a private
driveway across a lot forming part of a tract restricted to residential
purposes, constructed for the benefit of other lands of the owner lying
outside the restricted subdivision, but so refused only because sub-
sequent to defendant's purchase of the lot in question it appeared that
126 Misc. 493, 56 N.Y.S. 347 (1899).
172 Md. 547, 192 A. 341 (1937); See also Threedy v. Brennan, 131 F. 2d
488 (1942); Rabinowitz v. Rosen, 269 Pa. 482, 112 A. 762 (1921); Leonard v.
Hotel Majestic Co., 17 Misc. 229, 40 N.Y.S. 1044 (1896).
" 202 App. Div. 552, 195 N.Y.S. 793, Affd. 286 N.Y. 611, 142 N.E. 304
(1922).
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all the parties interested in the restricted land had agreed to remove
the specific restriction against such a driveway in so far as it con-
cerned the defendant's land. Thus, though the situation would at first
glance appear to be almost identical to the hypothetical situation herein
assumed, the added fact of the subsequent agreement obviously makes
this case distinguishable from the assumed situation.
There is another group of cases concerning restrictive covenants
on land, where certain types of buildings or structures are prohibited.
It has been held that in such a case the use or maintenance of a right
of way to permit ingress or egress cannot be said to be a violation of
the restrictive covenant since such a right of way cannot be said to be
such a building or structure as is expressly prohibited.17 In this con-
nection the Michigan court, in Johnson v. Fred L. Kircher Co.,18 was
faced with the following situation: The owner of a lot in a subdivision
subject to a restriction that "no shop, factory, store, saloon or business
house of any kind, no asylum, hospital, or institute of like or kindred
nature shall be maintained upon any portion.. ." of the lot involved,
granted the city, for use as a public alley, a strip through the center
of his lot from the street to an adjoining lot also owned by him. The
second lot was outside the restricted area and was used for business
purposes. The court held that this restriction only prohibited the
enumerated uses and did not specify that the use of lots in this sub-
division should be for residential purposes only, and further rejected
the contention that the use of the alley would extend the grantors
business conducted on the unrestricted lot to the restricted lot. It is
submitted that these cases may also be distinguished from the hypo-
thetical case set up in this note. The restriction in the hypothetical
situation is a general prohibition against using the land for any purpose
other than residential, and it would seem obvious that using land so
restricted as a public right of way would clearly be a breach of this
general restriction. In the cases just cited the restriction ran only to
specific uses, and a public right of way was not one of these specific
uses.
It must be recognized that certain political entities, public utilities,
etc., may, under our law, assert the right of eminent domain. The gen-
eral rule seems to be that such a political or corporate entity possessing
27 Hemenway v. Bartevian, 321 Mass. 226, 72 N.E. 2d 536 (1947); Lugg v.
Stirnweis, 43 N.Y.S. 2d 475 (1943); Wilson v. Middlesex Co., 244 Mass. 224, 138
N.E. 699 (1923).
" 827 Mich. 377, 42 N.W. 2d 117 (1950); See also Mairs v. Stevens, 268 App.
Div. 922, 51 N.Y.S. 2d 286 (1944), affd. without op. 294 N.Y. 806, 62 N.E. 2d
238 (1945); Neekamp v. Huntington Chamber of Commerce, 99 W. Va. 388, 129
S.E. 314 (1925).
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this right is not bound by a building restriction or restrictive covenant
to the extent that it may be kept off the restricted premises entirely,
but that such an entity may enter the restricted area and destroy its
exclusive character if it makes just compensation for the rights taken.19
In this connection, then, the problem herein posed will be some-
what changed if the following assumption is added to the hypo-
thetical situation originally suggested. Suppose that the defendant
dedicated the restricted lot in question to the county and now con-
tends that this action should be brought against the county since any
street constructed would be under the auspices of that political body.
Obviously then the defendant would not be asserting any right in his
individual capacity to breach the restrictive covenant. The question
which would then face the court would seem to be as follows: Can
the owner of land, restricted to residential purposes only, defeat this
restrictive covenant by dedicating the land to the county for purposes
prohibited by the restriction?
In Anderson v. Lynch2" the Georgia court dismissed a bill seeking
an injunction which would restrain a county from constructing a public
road across a lot which the owner had agreed to sell to the county and
which was subject to covenants restricting its use to "residence pur-
poses only... ." The court also held that the adjoining land owners
were not even entitled to notice or other compliance with the law as
to condemning property for such public purpose. Likewise, in Friesen
v. Glendale,21 the California court denied an injunction, sought by ad-
joining land owners, which would restrain a municipality from con-
structing a public street across a portion of a lot restricted to "residence
purposes only" and which the owners had deeded to the municipality
for street purposes. In Doan v. Cleveland Short Line R. Co.22 the Ohio
court denied damages for the construction of a railroad on lots similarly
restricted and which the railroad had purchased. And in Ward v.
Cleveland /. Co.2 3 the Ohio court, in a case involving a similar fact
situation, denied an injunction restraining the construction of the rail-
road. All these decisions were based primarily on two theories: (1)
that covenants restricting the use of land to residential purposes can-
not operate to prevent any party, politic or corporate, having the right
'" Flynn v. New York, supra note 10; Lubman v. New York, W. and B. Ry.
Co,. supra note 12: Hayes v. Waverly and P. R. Co., 51 N.J. Eq. 345, 27 A. 648
(1893).
'188 Ga. 154, 3 S.E. 2d 85 (1939).
" 209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 (1930); See also United States v. Certain Lands,
112 F. 622 (1899).
"92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N.E. 505 (1915).
Ohio St. 461, 112 N.E. 507 (1915).
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of eminent domain, from devoting the property to a public use, since
the right of eminent domain rests upon public necessity, and any
covenant which would prevent the exercise of this right would be con-
trary to public policy; and (2) that restrictive covenants as to the use
of land, which are enforceable as between parties thereto and their
successors with notice, do not convey any property right to those
parties in whose interest they are made which would entitle such
parties to compensation under the theory of eminent domain. It can-
not be denied that those parties, politics or corporate, which have the
right of eminent domain may devote restricted property to public use
even though to do so would breach the restrictive covenant.24 How-
ever, even under the theory of eminent domain such parties may not
condemn and put to public use an individual's property without mak-
ing due compensation to the individual whose property right is injured.
Thus it would seem that the first theory upon which these cases rest
is dependent upon the validity of the second theory-namely that
restrictive covenants as to the use of land create no property rights in
those parties in whose interest they are made. However it has already
been recognized herein that the weight of authority in this country is
that the right of parties in whose interest restrictive covenants are
entered into arises out of a property right and not out of a mere con-
tract right.25 Assuming this to be true it would then seem that even
though those parties possessed of the right of eminent domain could
not be prevented from putting restricted property to public use, they
would be infringing upon the property right of the owner of the
restricted lot, and also would be infringing upon a property right
belonging to any adjacent land owner in whose interest the restrictive
covenant was entered into. This being so, the party possessed of the
right of eminent domain should be forced to pay compensation to any
such adjoining land owners to the extent of the injury inflicted upon
their property right, and thus these last few cases would seem to be
based on a theory of only minority usage.
Further it might be said that in all these cases just mentioned, the
owner of the property to be put to public use had either deeded, sold,
or agreed to sell the property in question to the political entity or
corporation having the right of eminent domain, while in the hypo-
thetical situation herein posed the defendant-owner of restricted prop-
erty has only (with the added assumption) stated a desire to dedicate
the property to the county. The county has not accepted the dedica-
tion nor has it asserted any right thereunder. Thus it would seem
" Supra note 19. 'Supra note 10.
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doubtful that a transfer of any kind has been made to the county. At
common law a dedication, like a contract, consisted of an offer and an
acceptance, and the general rule today seems to be that a dedication
is not binding and conclusive as to either party until acceptance. 26
A dedication without an acceptance is merely an offer to dedicate, and
such offer does not impose any burdens or confer any rights.27 Ac-
ceptance of a dedication may be either actual or implied; it is actual
when formal acceptance is made by the proper authorities, and im-
plied when a use is made of the property by the public for a reason-
able length of time.28 Thus in the proposed hypothetical situation, as
amended, it would appear that here there is no valid dedication since
there has been neither a formal acceptance by the proper county
authorities nor an implied acceptance arising out of the fact that the
land has been put to public use, because as yet the land in question
has not been put to any public use whatsoever.
Conclusion. Considering the general rules concerning restrictive
covenants on land, and the cases which have been cited and examined
herein, it is submitted that in the hypothetical situation proposed the
plaintiff should prevail. It is submitted that, considering all the facts
as presented, a court faced with this problem should grant an in-
junction for several reasons.
It is admitted that covenants restricting the free use of land should
be, and generally are, strictly construed. Where such covenants are
open to more than one interpretation that interpretation which is
consonant with the free use of the land should be adopted. However,
as has been set forth, it is the intention of the parties as shown by the
agreement and surrounding circumstances that should govern in con-
struing any such covenant. Here the original owner of Subdivision I
induced prospective purchasers to take lots in his subdivision by stat-
ing that there would be no through traffic. It is submitted, then, that
it was the intention of all the parties interested in this property that
the restrictive covenant under which the lots were sold prohibited
exactly that extension of South Ridge Drive which the defendant has
proposed; namely, to make it a through street connecting Subdivision
II to Subdivision I.
Givens v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W. 2d 740 (Ky. 1951); Johnson v. Fergu-
son, 329 Mo. 363, 44 S.W. 2d 650 (1931); East Cairo Ferry Co. v. Brown, 233
Ky. 299, 25 S.W. 2d 730 (1930); Central Land Co. v. Central City, 222 Ky. 103,
300 S.W. 362 (1927).
' Town of Stratford v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 106 Conn. 34, 137 A. 13
(1927); Inyo County v. Given, 183 Cal. 415, 191 P. 688 (1920).
'Johnson v. Ferguson, 329 Mo. 363, 44 S.W. 2d 650 (1931); Inyo County
v. Given, supra note 27; cf. Town of Stratford v. Fidelity and Casualty Co.,
supra note 27.
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Assuming the above to be true-that this use, maintenance or
grant of a right of way would be a breach of the restrictive covenant-
an injunction may and should be granted if the requirements of
mutuality and notice are met. It has been said above that, unless
there is some mutuality of covenant, purchasers of lots in a restricted
subdivision may not enforce the covenant as against one another.
However, it has also been said that a recorded plat embodying the
restrictions will be sufficient evidence of the quasi-mutuality of covenant
necessary to allow such enforcement, and in the situation here being
considered there was such a recorded plat. Further, it has been recog-
nized that constructive as well as actual notice of the restriction is
enough to bind a subsequent purchaser, and in the hypothetical situa-
tion it was assumed that the defendant had not only constructive, but
actual, notice of the restriction.
Finally, under the original hypothetical situation the defendant
proposed to act in his individual capacity and, therefore cannot rely
on the right of eminent domain as a means of breaching the restrictive
covenant. However, when the added fact is assumed that the defendant
is only asserting a right to dedicate the lot in question to the county
for the purpose of constructing the proposed extension to South Ridge
Drive, the question of eminent domain does arise. As has been shown,
however, it is very probable that this proposed dedication should be
held invalid for lack of acceptance, and for that reason the necessity
of challenging the county's right to eminent domain is averted.
CHARi~s R. HAmm
CRIMINAL LAW-THE LAW AS TO CONCEALED
DEADLY WEAPONS
Man, by instinct, has always been and always will be concerned
with his own personal safety. Naturally, this concern has led to the
development of numerous instruments which he has used both for
offensive and defensive purposes. These instruments vary in descrip-
tion to such an extent that practically any object capable of inflicting
bodily injury has been used as a weapon. However, they all usually
have one common characteristic: they are relatively small and compact
and capable of being carried on the person. In their evolutional
development an attempt has been made to obtain a maximum of killing
power from the smallest possible weapon. In trying to reach this goal,
man has used everything from a rock to the powerful hand guns of
the present day.
